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Structure behind principles: Social selection mechanisms in 
corporate governance networks 
 
Slobodan Kacanski – Roskilde University, Denmark 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that social relations at a corporate governance platform between 
members of supervisory boards, and between members of supervisory and executive board tiers can serve as an 
alternative viewpoint towards understanding mechanisms of social selection in corporate governance networks. The 
paper shows that through the lenses of social network analysis it is possible to identify and understand how the process 
of corporate governance member selection unfolds within companies, and how that selection process might have been 
potentially influenced by the cross-board relations, such as interlocking directorships. 
Design/methodology/approach – To estimate network parameters and attribute effects of network tie emergence the 
paper utilizes exponential random graph models (ERGMs) on corporate governance data of Danish publicly listed 
companies. Econometric models are applied to estimate parameter statistics which serve further to explain tendencies of 
tie emergence. 
Findings – The results of the study reveal that the process of selection of both supervisory boards and executive directors 
are interdependent. Also, the study showed that board members are more likely to select popular supervisory board 
members and top managers who have their expertise gained through multiple companies affiliated with multiple 
industries. However, these conditions for CEO selection apply only to the extent to which they have their experience 
gained from multiple companies but not multiple industries. 
Originality/value – The study contributes both to practitioners and researchers. On one hand, it emphasizes that being 
a dynamic practitioner who is exposed to different companies affiliated with different companies and industries increases 
a visibility and attractiveness to companies’ boards. On the other hand, the paper shows that the research on board 
assemblage nowadays requires observing boards through networks instead of boards in isolation while also integrating 
executive tier.  
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Corporate boardroom processes have long been of interest to organizational researchers and 
practitioners, and in order to understand boards we need to understand the people who sit on them 
(Adams, 2017). The importance of corporate governance structure has motivated numerous studies 
to discuss board compositions and board and executive member selection processes (Kesner et al., 
1986). Both researchers and practitioners, such as national institutes of company directors, 
emphasized that outcomes of governing corporations (e.g. company performance) depend on a 
combination of competences that board members possess (AICD, 2016; Darko et al., 2016; Nordberg 
and Booth, 2019). In order to determine the combination of competences required by board 
representatives, companies are recommended to develop ‘skill matrices’ which will enable them to 
select those candidates that fit company demands (AICD, 2016). The skill matrices represent the 
outline of mandatory skills that further set out the conditions under which the assessment processes, 
and ultimately the selection of candidates for the supervisory boards, are administered. Matrices 
imply that the selection criteria are indicative of the diversification of expertise among existing and 
new board representatives, through which the synergetic effect is generated, and which further 
condition successful governance.  
A Cadbury report defines corporate governance as a system that enables directing and controlling 
business entities (Cadbury, 1992). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
emphasizes that assimilation of the concept of ‘relationship’ is nowadays fundamental for 
understanding corporate governance, as it has the potential to supplement and extend knowledge of 
corporate business strategies and board structures. This assertion indicates that relational ties existing 
between representatives of corporate boards have the capacity to reveal more information about how 
corporate boards are assembled, than does inspecting further the selection mechanisms and 
methodologies that companies apply to assemble boards (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988; Pfeffer, 1972; 
Allen, 1978, 1974; Stokman et al., 1985; Zeitlin, 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Following the argument by McPherson et al. (2001) and Freeman (2007) regarding the development 
of board selection processes, the requirement for diversification of skills at supervisory boards seems 
not to be sustainable under the following assertion. They argue that the homophily effect is the 
grounding principle under which corporate boards are established. Homophily indicates that social 
actors associate themselves with others similar to them (McPherson et al., 2001; Freeman, 2007), 
implying that it is not skill diversification that drives the selection process of corporate board 
composition, but rather the similarities among team members. 
Taking the into account that organizational research argues that similarities among the representatives 
of two-tier boards drive the selection process, this study aims to identify how social selection 
processes develop in the corporate governance context, and whether homophily represents one of the 
main effects that drives the selection processes. Additionally, this paper extends further the discussion 
about selection processes beyond the boundaries of supervisory boards, as it incorporates the selection 
of executive directors within the model to identify the logic that supervisory board members follow 
to select appropriate executive directors. Thus, both corporate governance tiers are simultaneously 
investigated through the methodology of social network analysis while taking into account the 
condition of interdependence (Lusher et al., 2013). This condition assumes that both selection 
processes are mutually susceptible, and arguably, do not develop in isolation from each other. Thus, 
this paper leads to further discussion on whether – and if so, how – tendencies towards homophily 
and preferences for particular corporate board representatives create an interplay of social selection 
mechanisms in the two tiers of corporate governance. Following this, the paper argues that corporate 
board social selection processes do not develop in isolation and at random, but that the selection 
depends both on the selection conducted by the other boards and on the personal characteristics of 
the actors. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
 
Corporate governance theory suggests that shareholders, as asset owners, represent those who are 
responsible for corporate decisions. In practice, companies employ agents (supervisory and executive 
directors) who will be responsible for both determining and executing companies’ strategic decisions 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It is essential that supervisory boards’ decisions are in compliance with 
shareholders’ incentives in order to prevent principal-agent problems, as non-executive directors 
should prioritize shareholders’ interests over their own (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). The literature 
suggests that one of the main responsibilities that boards have, besides safeguarding shareholders 
from management misappropriations (Minichilli et al., 2012), is to decide on the composition of two-
tier board systems.  
 
2.1. Supervisory board member structures 
 
Boards of directors represent a formal link between shareholders and top management (Mintzberg, 
1983, Monks and Minow, 1998). They symbolize the apex of company’s decision control system 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983: 311), which is interdependent and particularly vulnerable to process losses 
(Steiner, 1972).  
Supervisory board members are selected according to their qualifications, experience and knowledge. 
It is fundamental that the experience and knowledge of newcomers correspond well with the 
company’s business strategy and the overall structure of the corporate governance structure. Since 
boards of directors are not responsible for the execution of daily tasks (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), 
they are not expected to be experienced professionals who have the same level of understanding of 
the company as the executive directors (Treadwell, 2006; Kakabadse et al., 2001). Supervisory board 
members have part-time engagement with the company they govern, which enables them, without 
limitations, to hold multiple supervisory board affiliations (interlocking directorships), which gives 
them power to directly control the decision-making processes on each board they represent. 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) observed the control and service tasks of boards of directors in the context 
of interpersonal conflict in US companies. They argue that the homophily effect (McPherson et al., 
2001) is a crucial driver of in-group coherence, which is particularly important for suppression of 
interpersonal conflicts during decision-making processes (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Their findings 
show that cognitive conflicts may be expected to escalate if board members have disparate education 
levels, or different functional and industry backgrounds. Also, if group members exhibit homophily, 
increases in diversity can disrupt the functioning of the group (Adams, 2017; Giannetti and Zhao, 
2016; Bernile et al., 2018; O’Regan et al., 2005). That is because individuals of different backgrounds 
tend to perceive, comprehend and respond to a particular situation differently, which may lead to 
difficulties during decision-making processes and in-group confrontations (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999; Garlappi, et al., 2016; Adams et al., 2016; Ingley and van der Walt, 2003), which can be 
disruptive (Horstmeyer, 2017). Williams and O’Reilly (1998) emphasized that demographic diversity 
is associated with the lower level of interpersonal attraction within groups, which leads to the lower 
integration level. 
Following Burt’s (1992) theory of structural holes, it could be argued that exactly those actors who 
bridge two structures, e.g. teams, boards, etc., may have the most significant influence on both boards, 
as their brokering function enables the exchange of information between groups.  
Based on the argument that interlocking directorships and homophily effects might drive the 
composition of supervisory boards, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: Non-executive directors tend to select and collaborate with those non-executive directors 
who are similar to them. 
  
2.2. Executive directors’ selection process and selection preferences 
 
Supervisory boards are responsible of monitoring and scrutinizing executive directors on behalf of 
the shareholders (Hallman and Dalziel, 2003). Besides, members of the supervisory boards are 
accountable to shareholders for the selection of internal and/or hiring of external executive directors. 
Considering that boards meet few times per year, they are incentivized to engage credible and 
responsible executives in order to ensure the execution of corporate decisions. The selection of top 
managers is a particularly sensitive topic for supervisory boards, as the appropriate selection of 
executive directors is vital to the performance and survival of organizations (Vinkenburg et al., 2014), 
and should be different from the selection of lower hierarchical employee levels (Hollenbeck, 2009).  
Following the stratified systems theory, the engagement of appropriate executives is a particularly 
delicate subject matter for supervisory board members because each consecutive level in the 
organizational hierarchy supports a higher level of complexity involved in decision-making processes 
(Jacques and Clement, 1991). Therefore, executive director levels bear a high level of complexity 
due to interaction with and dependency on various stakeholders, as making decisions at top 
management levels requires taking into account various economic, financial, political, sociocultural, 
and technological considerations, with respect to both short and long term (Carpenter and 
Frederickson, 2001; Hooijberg et al., 1997).  
Another important structural condition is high visibility of executive directors (Vinkenburg et al., 
2014), as this condition is highly linked to interaction and dependency on key stakeholders (Harisson 
et al., 1988) who often control important resources (Pfeffer and Slancik, 1978). Such visibility makes 
the executive directors become a key target for symbolic gestures (Walsch, 1988). Supervisory 
boards, however, only intrinsically and mainly ambiguously formulate a set of expectations they have 
from executive directors, and thus the engagement of top managers still represents the black box of 
the theory of corporate governance. Therefore, executive directors tend to share unaligned 
perceptions of what behaviour is expected from them (Beaty et al., 2001), and what expertise they 
should possess in order to be attractive enough for the boards. On the other hand, the arrangement of 
executive directors is a problem as the decision about the appointment may be risky for the top tier, 
and the engagement itself requires the executives to bear a high level of risk after the appointment of 
an executive director, as the latter becomes a member of the dominant elite (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). Finally, members of top management are considered powerful on account of their accumulated 
experience, reputation and access to internal and external networks (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004), 
allowing them to make realistic threats, such as leaving for the competition (Giambatista et al., 2005).  
Taking into account the previous considerations on which supervisory board members base their 
decisions on executive director selection, such as the high level of complexity, visibility, ambiguity, 
risk, and power, this paper assumes that it could be expected that board members are inclined to 
engage those executives who are both more experienced (by being engaged by multiple companies, 
preferably across different industries) and, therefore, more popular (by having established multiple 
relations with relatively more shareholders than the others). 
Following this, the paper employs the straightforward assertion to hypothesize the following: 
H2a: A board of directors is likely to collaborate with more popular and multiple company-  
and industry-experienced executive directors. 
 
Lastly, this paper distinguishes the CEO position in top management from the other executive 
directors in order to determine whether – and if so, how – boards of directors establish preferences 
towards particular individuals. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) provided the evidence that boards play 
a significant role in few corporate decisions, where arguably the most important ones are those 
pertaining to the selection, monitoring and retention of the CEO.  
The literature argues that the selection of chief executive officers may be both internal and external. 
On one hand, earlier studies demonstrated that preferences for the appointment of an internal 
candidate to the position of CEO guarantee a better understanding of a company’s internal operations 
due to professional expertise (Westphal, 1998; Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001). On the other hand, recent 
literature acknowledges that supervisory boards are, in fact, more likely to prefer external candidates 
over the internal ones for the position of CEO (Hermalin, 2005). Boards of directors deliver 
knowledge to the company they represent, which is nourished by an extensive past experience 
acquired elsewhere (Roberts et al., 2005). This is because those CEOs gained relatively more 
expertise by being engaged by different companies and industries (Roberts and Stiles, 1999). But at 
the same time, their tenure is shorter while receiving a higher remuneration (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998).  
Taking into accounting the fact that non-executive directors are expected to provide a different type 
of expertise to the company, this paper argues that supervisory boards are prone to engaging external 
rather than internal CEOs, as the former have had the opportunity to acquire professional expertise in 
more companies and industries. Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H2b: Boards of directors tend to select a CEO who has acquired experience from multiple 
 companies and multiple industries. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Sources of data  
 
The hypotheses were tested through empirical analysis applied to a dataset of public listed companies 
in Denmark. The dataset includes the entire sample of all business entities whose shares were traded 
on the Danish Stock Exchange (Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen) during the period from 2010 to 2014. 
That period was selected because the two audit firm mergers in Denmark characterized the periods 
both before and after the time frame set for this study. This is because it was expected that the mergers 
might distort the corporate governance structure and the board composition due to audit partner 
defection, which could mean that a certain number of board representatives move to other boards or 
resign from current ones.  
The list of companies was identified through interim reports on share trading on 31 December for 
each of the five years, published by the Stock Exchange. The interim reports were used as the 
guidelines for collection of annual statements from which the relational and attribute data related to 
both supervisory and executive directors were identified and extracted. Few data sources were used 
to collect the annual statements: (1) a registry of all Danish business entities – Virk.dk, (2) official 
company websites (section for investor relations), and if the data was unavailable from one of the 
previous two sources, the rest of the data was collected (3) through direct contact with the companies. 
Annual statements were used as, according to Danish regulations, publicly listed companies are 
required to disclose information on corporate governance structures, which includes both supervisory 
boards and executive directors. 
The entire list of publicly traded companies was incorporated into the study in order to fulfil the 
requirement of completeness, as it is critical for research into social networks (Robins, 2015). This 
resulted in the sample of 774 business entities (165, 162, 153, 149, 145 respectively for each year). 
During the observed period, there were in total 1,236 unique supervisory board members and 501 
unique executive directors who were affiliated with 191 unique business entities. The following Table 
1 provides the details on the selected sample.  
Table 1 – The sample of companies, supervisory board members and executive directors 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Number of companies 165 162 153 149 145 
Number of supervisory board members 969 962 922 897 894 
Number of executive directors 382 385 357 348 352 







































3.2. The network 
 
In order to investigate how two-tier collaborative relations develop in corporate governance networks 
and provide the answer to how social relations emerge in that context, network analysis is applied. 
To do so, the units of the analysis are determined; in this study they represent the relations within the 
corporate governance platform among supervisory board members and between supervisory board 
members and executive directors. In order to extract the information on relational ties, first the 
network nodes are defined. The nodes that assemble the network are the social actors (people) who 
represent each of the board tiers for each selected company, among whom relationships develop. 
Relationships represent collaborative ties that portray ‘who works with whom’ at the same corporate 
governance level of the company.  
A simplified visualization of the collaboration network within and across two-tier board systems is 
presented in Figure 1. Supervisory board members are represented by blue squares and top managers 
are shown by red circles. In the network visualization, the dashed lines represent collaborations 
between supervisory board members. According to the visualization, members who sit on the same 
board of directors form a clique-based network configuration, which determines that everyone is 
connected to everyone else (Robins, 2015). Board members who share relationships with two cliques 
are the ones who sit on multiple boards at the same time, and thus occupy interlocking directorship 
positions. Solid lines represent collaboration between the two tiers, namely, between supervisory and 
executive members. Both groups of ties represent social selection processes that occur regarding 
board member selection by boards and top management member selection by supervisory boards. 
The bottom level of the network of the top management tier was excluded from the study, as top 
management is considered as it should not have a significant impact on either the supervisory board 
selection process or the top management selection process (Adams, 2017). 
The network that is observed here is multilevel, and it is assembled from the two types of nodes and 
two types of relational ties (Robins, 2015; Wang et al., 2013). This study includes information on 
social selection processes that develop over the five years, and therefore has a perennial (multi-year) 
character. Though a perennial sample was included in the model, many collaboration/selection ties 
reappeared during data extraction. Those overlaps were excluded as the ties were not treated as 
weighted to refer to the strength of ties, which resulted in removing dyadic covariates from the model. 
This is because tenured positions and length of board members’ contracts were not taken as 
explanatory variables to potentially influence social selection processes at both network levels.  
  
Figure 1 - Simplified network visualization 
 
Assuming that networks emerge either through self-organization or social selection, the focus of this 
paper is on the latter process, as the study observes the impact of exogenous attributes on tie formation 
propensity (Lusher et al., 2013). For the first part of the model, in which supervisory board network 
parameters are estimated, the central focus is on the homophily effect (Robins, 2015). Homophily 
implies that relations between two actors tend to emerge if they hold the same attributes (McPherson 
et al., 2001). The argument behind the idea of integrating the homophily parameter is that in-group 
coherences are essential to board representatives, and board composition based on similar cognitions 
enables board members to diminish the probability of escalation of conflicts that might emerge due 
to dissimilarities (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). In this study, the homophily effect is observed through 
the attribute match, particularly if the same attribute value (such as expertise gained through different 
companies and industries) is held by two board members who share the tie (sit on the same board).  
In the second level of the network, the attributes of each representative on corporate boards and in 
corporate managements were also integrated into the model. The attributes represent the theoretical 
arguments outlined in the section on theoretical background and hypotheses development, and 
include information about the experience that individual board and executive members gained during 
the observed period. Following the theory, information on previous experience on different boards 
and affiliations with different companies and industries was used as explanatory variables to provide 
a more detailed explanation of how social relations emerge. In particular, the aim of the attributes 
was to give further clarification on why particular attribute holders (e.g., those having more than one 
affiliation with different companies and/or industries over the observed period) tend to attract more 
attention, and therefore, become more popular nodes in the network (Vinkenburg et al., 2014). 
The outcome of a model estimation is a probability of the overall network structure in terms of 
parameters associated with a particular pattern. Patterns reflect the influence of personal 
characteristics on actors’ embeddedness in the observed interpersonal network. Additionally, a major 
assumption of the method is that patterns are interdependent and serve as a control for network 
endogenous processes (Robins et al., 2007). 
 
3.3. Research methodology 
 
While accounting for the condition of interdependence, social network analysis (SNA) methodology 
has the capacity to identify network structuring principles (network configurations) that are capable 
of explaining the internal processes that occur within the observed network (Robins, 2015). 
To apply SNA methodology in the study, this paper utilizes a recently developed cutting-edge 
statistical model called exponential random graph models (Wang et al., 2018). ERGMs represent the 
state of the art for the analysis of interdependence structures, and operates as a pattern-recognition 
device concerned with explaining the patterns of ties in social networks (Frank and Strauss, 1986; 
Wassermann and Pattison, 1996; Lusher et al., 2013). For the purpose of modelling the network 
structural parameters, the MPnet software was adopted (Wang et al., 2013). 
The underlying assumption of ERGMs is that stochastic (random) processes characterize the manner 
in which social relations between social actors are generated, and can explain the propensity of 
network tie emergence. In practice, this implies that ERGMs hold the premise that social networks 
are comprised of small mechanisms that lead to tie formation processes, and that through the 
estimation of dispositions, those mechanisms can be modelled and determined. What is specific for 
the network studies is that the patterns of network ties (some of them are presented in Table 2) 
delineate dependent variables whose presence in the network has the explanatory power to identify 
and describe the internal processes that characterize the emergence of the network (Wang et al., 
2018). On a single tie scale, this means that the emergence of a single tie is influenced by the presence 
or the absence of the other ties in the network. Whereas on the network scale, this principle implies 
that the existence of a particular group of network mechanisms (configurations) is mutually  
Table 2 - Summary of network effects included in the exponential random graph model 
Pattern Visualization Interpretation 
 
Single-level structural parameters 
   Edge  An edge connecting two nodes (a baseline propensity of a tie formation). 
   Star parameter 
   ASA*  
Indicative of the presence of highly central 
supervisory board members within a network. 
Models the degree distribution. 
   One-mode level closure  
   ATA 
 
 Within level closure parameter. Indicative of triadic clustering between board members. 
   One-mode level Indirect 
   connectivity A2PA 
 Indirect connectivity. Indicative of actors being connected through multiple boards but not directly. 
 
Cross-level structural parameters 
   Edge – XEdge*  A baseline propensity to a meso-level tie formation (non-executive selecting an executive director). 
   Non-executive director  
   popularity effect - XASA  
Parameter indicates presence of highly central 
supervisory board members. 
 
   Executive director popularity  
   effect - XASB  
Parameter indicates presence of highly central top 
managers. 
 
   Non-executive director-centred  
   clustering - XACB  
Two non-executive directors selecting the same top 
managers. 
 
   Non-executive director closure -   
   ATXAX  
Between level closure parameter. Indicative of triadic 
clustering between executive and non-executive 
directors.  
Attribute effects   
InteractionA* 
  
Indicative of interaction between board members 
who have multiple board and/or industry affiliations 
TwoPath111A 
  
Star homophily parameter – indicative of transitive 
connection between board members holding for 
multiple board and/or industry affiliations 
TwoPath101A 
  
Transitive connection between board members 
holding attribute through the other who is not a 
holder of the attribute 
SumA 
 
Interaction with multiple summed number of 
companies and industries 
X2StarB101 
 
Tendency towards selection of multiple actors who 
hold the same attribute 
X2StarB010 
 
Popularity effect driven by a particular attribute (top 
manager was affiliated with multiple 
companies/industries) 
*Indicates name/abbreviation for network parameters according to Wang et al., 2013 








dependent on the existence of the other ones, which signifies that structures in the network evolve 
because the other structures in the network evolve and exist as well. It is precisely those internal 
processes that represent the condition of interdependence on which this study relies (Wang et al., 
2018). 
The selection of the structuring principles integrated into the model is theory driven and the visual 
appearances of these principles, outlined in Table 2, resemble the social reality of actions that occur 
in the observed context.  
For multilevel networks, ERGMs could formally be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑋 = 𝑥	𝑌 = 𝑦) = +,
-
. 𝑒𝑥𝑝 +1 Θ3𝑍3(𝑥, 𝑦)3 .                                                                             (1) 
In the previous expression, X denotes the network variable for a network with n nodes, and x denotes 
the corresponding realization. While Y is an array of actor attribute variables with realizations y. ZQ(x, 
y) is a network statistic counting the number of network patterns of type Q for a particular network 
realization x and given the vector of attributes y. Θ3 is the parameter corresponding to the statistics 
ZQ(x, y), and k is a normalizing constant included to ensure that the formula is a proper probability 
distribution. The summation is taken over all network patterns Q that are integrated in the model. The 
probability of observing any network x in this distribution is both dependent on statistics ZQ(x, y) and 
the corresponding parameter values Θ3 for all patterns in the model (Brennecke and Rank, 2016). 
Building on criteria recommended by Wang et al. (2013), I tested the model for goodness of fit, and 
identified that, for all patterns introduced in the model, t-values were below the threshold of 0.1, while 
for the all the others, they were below 2.0 in their absolute value.  
 
3.4. Limitations of the dataset 
 
Previous research emphasized two limitations related to tracking the selection of CEOs, and 
categorization of those into the group of internal or external candidates that this paper also refers to. 
First, prior to making the final selection of candidates for the position of Chief Executive, firms tend 
to hire heir-apparents from outside for a few years before they become CEOs (Hermalin, 2005). In 
the recent study on the USA corporate governance case, it was reported that 22% of newly employed 
CEOs have less than five years of experience with the company they have been appointed to lead. 
Such an empirical practice muddies the distinction between internal and external candidates, and 
according to Hermalin (2005), creates data-definition problems for econometricians. The second 
limitation is that companies sometimes tend to employ interim CEOs when the previous one 
unexpectedly departs. Thus, in order to fill in the temporary shortage of an appropriate duty officer, 
companies tend to engage insiders who will, by definition, have short tenures (Eldenburg et al., 2004). 
This paper argues that the application of a further elaborated statistical method for network research 
omits the potential disadvantage of a statistical modelling issue. 
 
4. Analysis and discussion of results 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 outlines the descriptive statistics of the corporate governance network by capturing the most 
relevant features of the multilevel supervisory board and non-executive directorship network. The 
table isolates only limited information on the sample related to a single year sampled, in order to 
provide information on the size of the sample that was used to develop the main network from each 
fragment. The average number of companies per year for the observed period is 154.8, governed by, 
on average, a total of 932.6 supervisory board members and 356.6 executive directors across the 
entire sample. An average size of supervisory board is 6.69 members with standard deviation of 2.62 
members across the overall five-year sample. The ratio of top managers per board is 4.69 members  
Table 3 - Descriptive statistics 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Number of companies          (average 154.8) 165 162 153 149 145 
Number of board members (average 932.6) 970 963 922 898 899 
Number of top managers     (average 356.6) 378 375 356 342 332 
Number of board members per board 
m=6.69 
SD=2.62 
Number of top managers per board 
m=4.69 
SD=1.45 
Number of unique representatives of board members in the sample (N1) 1236 
Number of unique representatives of top management members in the sample (N2)  501 
Board network density 0:00 
Top management – board network density 0.00 
Board attributes - binary and continuous 
Average number of companies board member was engaged by over the observed time m=1.21 SD=1.34 
Average number of industries board member was engaged by over the observed time m=1.30 SD=0.68 
Top management attributes – binary 
Number of executive board positions (0 – one; 1 – more than one) 0.59 
Number of CEO positions occupied by top managers (0 – one; 1 – more than one) 0.41 
Engagement of top manager across multiple industries (0 – one; 1 – more than one)  0.57 
 
with a standard deviation of 1.45 top managers per executive team. After the elimination of duplicates 
and isolation of unique values, the complete sample ended up with a size of 1,236 unique board  
members and 501 executive directors. Despite a relatively large sample of network nodes, the network  
is characterized by a low-density level (Wassermann and Faust, 1994). The low network density level  
is conditioned by the number of positions on each corporate board, the number of mandatory top 
managers engaged in executive positions, and the number of interlocks that emerge across boards.  
The average number of companies an individual supervisory board member is engaged by is 1.21 
(with a standard deviation of 1.34). This indicates that establishing an interlocking directorship is 
common practice among supervisory board members in Denmark. Also, the average number of 
industries that a board member is engaged in is 1.30. The following Table 3 presents the descriptive 
statistics as ratios.  
Approximately 59% of all executive directors in the observed sample have occupied an executive 
position in more than one company during the five-year period, which indicates a relatively higher 
executive director turnover rate. During the observed period, 41% of executives have also occupied 
at least two CEO positions in at least two different companies, which shows a possible tendency for 
selection of experienced executive directors, rather than internal ones. Lastly, more than half of the 
overall sampled top managers – around 57% –represented more than one executive board in 
companies affiliated to different industries. 
 
 
4.2. Results of model estimations for multilevel networks 
 
Table 4 represents results of the model estimation, incorporating five years’ data, for a supervisory 
board and top management network. The results in the table are arranged in vertical and horizontal 
sections. The vertical sections represent three models regarding to the number of network effects that 
are incorporated into models. Model 1 observes parameters only for a top-level network, which 
integrates only structuring principles of the top-tier network. Model 2 presents parameter estimates 
only for main structuring principles, while model 3 additionally incorporates nodal attributes to enrich 
discussion of the results, and gives answers to the previously developed hypotheses. Such a 
presentation of the results helps to better understand how the exclusion of particular network 
configurations might distort the modelling of in-network processes. The horizontal sections represent 
network parameters in the form of top- and meso-level configurations together with the network 
effects that represent nodal attributes. Hence, the results of the model estimations reveal that the 
network observed is characterized by a number of single-level and multilevel patterns that tend to 
emerge more or less often than what would be expected by their random occurrence. In the following, 
the structuring parameters are discussed together with the attribute effects in their logical order of 
occurrence. 
 
4.2.1. Structuring principles of board membership networks 
 
Table 4 displays the outcome of the network parameter estimations by including the network effects 
that capture structural parameters for both parts of the network related to supervisory boards, and 
supervisory boards and executive directors, together with the attribute effects. The presentation of the 
results from the model estimation follows the consecutive order of those network effects that are 
estimated as significant.  
An edge parameter is usually included in modelling network structuring principles and functions as 
the control parameter that indicates a general propensity of network tie formation (Lusher et al., 2013) 
and is usually not discussed. A negative significant value of the edge parameter only indicates that 
board members infrequently create ties outside the more complex structural patterns characterizing 
the network. The model also included the three-star popularity and activity network configuration 
Star3A, which is categorized as Markov and not as a social circuit dependence parameter (Robins et 
al., 2007), as the other configurations included in the model are classified. That configuration was 
integrated to enable network convergence and improve the model fit, especially in those cases in 
which degree distributions are highly skewed (Robins et al., 2007; Snijders et al., 2006).  
The star parameter ASA captures the popularity of certain nodes within the network. The effect mirrors 
the analytical notion of a degree centrality developed by Freeman (1979), which reflects the 
prominence of a social actor within the observed network (Lusher et al., 2013) and indicates an 
intuitive notion of the activity of a single node (Robins, 2015). In the main model, the positive 
parameter value of the popularity effect shows that the network is characterized by the presence of 
those supervisory board members who tend to receive more nominations for selection as board 
members than the others would receive. The parameter indicates also that in the corporate governance 
network, some board members are more active than others, as they were involved in many board 
structures, and thus collaborated with relatively more board members than the others. Also, this 
parameter demonstrates that the network of supervisory board members is widely spread, which 
implies that the network is characterized by tendencies to establish cross-board ties (interlocks). Such 
a result implies that some supervisory board representatives, while sitting on multiple boards, tend to 
Table 4 - Results of the exponential random graph models for supervisory and executive director selection ties 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (main) 
Network endogenous patterns – Board-level network   
Edge - Edge -5.8815* (0.306) -6.7607* (0.324) -6.1215* (0.038) 
Star3A -0.0045** (0.001) -0.0051 (0.004) -0.0041 (0.003) 
Star parameter - ASA 1.546* (0.078) 1.457* (0.082) 1.392* (0.091) 
One-mode level closure - ATA 1.0033*** (0.007) 0.998*** (0.008) 1.012*** (0.01) 
One-mode level Indirect connectivity - A2PA -0.386 (0.204) -0.412 (0.303) -0.399 (0.204) 
Network endogenous patterns – Board - top management level network   
Edge - Xedge  -6.684* (1.047) -5.2351* (1.6638) 
Non-executive director popularity effect - XASA  1.047* (0.036) 1.022* (0.042) 
Executive director popularity effect - XASB  1.6638* (0.062) 1.2536* (0.71) 
Executive director-centred clustering - XACA  1.0435 (0.654) 1.1202 (0.755) 
Non-executive director centred clustering – XACB  -1.0918 (0.621) -1.1213 (0.634) 
Non-executive director closure – ATXAX  1.1043* (0.178) 1.0931* (0.055) 
Attribute effects    
Homophily multiple board interaction –  
NUM_COMP_InteractionA 
  0.2391* (0.114) 
Star homophily parameter –
BOARD_MULTI_POS_TwoPath111A 
  0.3050* (0.015) 
Homophily multiple industry interaction –  
NUM_IND _InteractionA 
  1.138* (0.026) 
Star homophily parameter - 
BOARD_MULTY_BOARDS_TwoPath111A 
  0.1064* (0.026) 
Boards select executives who were representatives in 
multiple companies - NUM_COMP_SumA 
  0.1412* (0.0184) 
Boards select executives who were employed in more 
than one industry - NUM_IND_SumA 
  -1.1336* (0.0237) 
Boards select CEOs who were representatives in multiple 
companies - MAN_MULTI_POS_X2StarB010 
  0.3391* (0.014) 
Boards select CEOs who were employed in more than 
one industry MAN_MULTI_IND_X2StarB010 
  -1.121* (0.562) 
Building on criteria recommended by Wang et al. (2013), all the models were for goodness of fit, and identified that, for all patterns 
introduced in the model, t-values were below the threshold of 0.1, while for the all the others, below 2.0 in their absolute value. 
*     Indicates significant effect at Lambda = 2     The value of l = 2 has been used here as an initial value as it has been proven to be  
**   Indicates significant effect at Lambda = 4     reasonable for many ERGM estimations; however, higher values contribute   
*** Indicates significant effect at Lambda = 6     convergence in the case of highly skewed degree distributions (Koskinen & Daraganova,   
                                                                                     2013; Robins et al., 2007) 
 
occupy a brokerage position; by filling in structural holes (Burt, 2004), they play a key role in 
spreading their expertise across the boards they represent. Additionally, these findings also indicate 
that the network is characterized by the presence of board members who might have better structural 
and positional embeddedness in the network than others (Gilsing et al., 2016). A possible explanation 
for this might be that some board members have specialized knowledge or a better reputation in the 
network than others, resulting in a higher likelihood of preferential attachments; this could further 
lead to receiving more nominations for selections than others. 
Two parameters that capture the closure effect (ATA) and indirect connectivity (A2PA) (Robins et al., 
2009) were integrated into the model to measure the tendency to cluster. This positive and significant 
parameter demonstrates the configuration in which two supervisory board representatives who, by 
sharing a collaborative relation, tend to be engaged with the same multiple other members of the same 
or different supervisory boards. According to the model estimation, the network is characterized by 
tendencies towards within-level closure, rather than by indirect connectivity. This result shows that 
cooperative ties tend to form triangles, rather than random ties, which captures the complexity of 
dynamics in corporate networks. Triangles illustrate that ties tend to emerge not only between the 
focal supervisory board representative and the two others, but between the two others as well. This 
shows that the propensity for closure tie emergence is indicative of possible similarities between the 
two disconnected ones, which afterwards establish the relational tie to form further collaboration. The 
attribute effect is further elaborated in order to take a closer look at the popularity and closure 
mechanisms. 
Results from the model estimation show that members of supervisory boards tend to collaborate with 
those others who have interactions both with multiple companies and, preferably, across multiple 
industries. Both tie and transitive triangle homophily effects are positive and significant. The 
significant attribute parameters illustrate that expertise gained with a single company or multiple 
companies belonging to the same industry do not make board members potentially attractive to 
corporate boards. In contrast, the findings indicate that corporate boards tend to establish 
collaborative ties with those supervisory board members who have diversified knowledge and 
experience across multiple companies and industries rather than those who have more specialized 
expertise (AICD, 2016). Also, this tendency towards diversification is found to be a driving force for 
both popularity and closure effects, as those supervisory board members are both more popular in the 
network and also have a higher propensity to establish relationships with others who are similar to 
them. This means that what drives the closure is, in fact, the similarity of diversified knowledge and 
experience among those who establish closure. To this end, it could be argued that the homophily 
effect is an underlying process that captures the network structuring effect at the supervisory board 
level of the network. Thus, such an indication provides sufficient evidence to support H1. 
 
 4.2.2. Structuring principle of board-top management networks  
 
 
Following the same structure, the findings from the model of the supervisory board and executive 
directorship network is presented in this section. The baseline propensity for meso-level network tie 
formation was accordingly included in the model (XEdge), and indicates the general tendency towards 
the emergence of ties between board members and top management in regard to the collaboration and 
selection process. Similarly, serving as the control mechanism, the negative and significant parameter 
indicates that top managers and board members rarely establish collaborative relations outside more 
complex structural patterns characterizing the network. Along with that, two additional cross-level 
activity parameters were included in the model and both concern the popularity effects as measures 
of centralization of nodes (XASA and XASB) from two opposite perspectives. Both popularity effects 
refer to the tendency for significantly active board members and supervisory board representatives to 
be present in a cross-network collaboration process. Both activity network parameters are positive 
and significant, which indicates that a meso-level network tends to interbreed activity effects both 
among boards towards managers and among top managers towards board members. These effects 
indicate that, on one hand, supervisory boards tend to find a particular special group of executive 
directors more attractive to collaborate with. At the same time, executive directors tend also to 
establish collaborative relations with those supervisory board members who are more central in the 
network. 
Also, the clustering and closure effects are integrated into the meso-level network to identify whether 
executive directors are prone to be selected by those supervisory board members who mutually 
collaborate both within and across boards (interlocks), or the top-level collaboration between 
supervisory board representatives does not condition the emergence of a tie with executive directors. 
Both cross-level clustering XACB and closure ATXAX effects were included, as they were considered 
mutually exclusive parameters. Contrary to the clustering effect in the model, which is negative and 
insignificant, the closure effect holds both positive and significant parameter values. This finding 
demonstrates that top-level collaborations impact selection and collaboration with the same other 
executives.  
In addition to that, the model also tested whether collaboration is conditioned by the level of 
experience gained with multiple companies and industries. Attribute parameters showed insignificant 
company-related parameter values, while for the attribute related to multiple directorships at different 
companies, the parameter estimation is positive and significant. The findings here indicate that boards 
of directors have preferences towards those executives who have experience gained in more than one 
company but within the same industry. These results extend what we know about board member 
selection and collaboration with executives, as it highlights augments the importance of 
professionalism and specialized knowledge in a particular industry. Because supervisory boards are 
not particularly interested in those executives who were engaged by companies in different industries, 
but only within the industry knowledge, the findings here only partially support Hypothesis 2a, but 
provide significant input to the theory. 
Lastly, the model tested whether or not supervisory board members tend to select those CEOs who 
also have experience across multiple companies and/or industries. The results demonstrate a clear 
tendency towards the selection of those CEOs who acquired expertise through affiliation with more 
companies belonging to different industries. Interestingly, both effects are positive and significant, 
which means that board selection of CEOs is rather centralized around those popular CEOs who have 
expertise acquired through their engagements with multiple industries. This evidence fully supports 
Hypothesis 2b. 
5. Conclusion 
This study attempted to estimate the presence of particular types of network configurations in 
corporate governance networks in order to explain the unfolding of social selection mechanisms in 
that context. The combination of selected network parameters and attribute effects corresponds well 
with the theoretical arguments used to build the hypotheses, and provides a good fit for the relation 
between theory and data. While responding to Pettigrew’s (1992) appeal that future research on 
structures of corporate boardrooms should put more emphasis on board behaviour to explain the 
implications for demography and structures, the intention behind this paper was to translate this call 
into the study and observe the characteristics of network structuring processes (Pfeffer, 1983; Adams, 
2017). The paper extended the scope of observation of board selection processes from in-board to 
cross-board structures in order to account for the interdependency of tie emergence at the cross-board 
and two-tier level. 
In general, results show that both the supervisory board and the network’s supervisory board and 
management parts evolve under mutually interdependent structuring principles. These findings are in 
line with Forbes and Milliken’s (1999) general claim that studying board selection mechanisms can 
help clarify the complexity of board designs. The findings here indicate that the structuring processes 
of two-tier boards are equally important for understanding of the evolution of corporate governance 
networks and should not be observed exclusively. This study shows that, under cross-network 
observation, board members distribute equally incentives to selection and collaboration with 
appropriate representatives in both tiers.  
More specifically, the results reveal that representatives of the supervisory board tier have a tendency 
to select both popular supervisory board members and popular executive directors. This implies that 
prominence for selection is subject to the actual position of individuals in the overall corporate 
governance network in both tiers. That finding also supports the claim that, from a demographic 
perspective, the evolution and composition of corporate boards are not simple and direct, but rather 
complex and indirect (Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Darko 
et al., 2016; Nordberg and Booth, 2019). In addition, these findings are in line with Smith et al. 
(1994), who argued that the structure of boards both directly and indirectly impacts companies’ 
performance, and explains why it was appropriate to observe the networks that lie behind the 
structures, instead of structures in isolation from the networks (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et 
al., 1996; Daily and Schwenk, 1996). The study also reveals that complexity behind demographic 
structures is not only a matter of the structures themselves (such as popularity and closure), but is 
also indicative of the attributes held by the representatives in both tiers of the boards (Vinkenburg et 
al., 2014; Beaty et al., 2001 Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004). This is in line with Williams and 
O’Reilly’s (1998) assertion that demographic diversities on corporate boards are associated with a 
lower level of interpersonal attractions, confirming that preferential attachments tend to be driven by 
similar attributes shared on both sides of relational ties. The attribute effects demonstrate that, in 
general, supervisory and executive directorship structures are highly impacted both by the match of 
attributes between the actors forming the tie (supervisory board network) and by the preferences for 
particular types of attributes (supervisory-executive directorship network). Following the assertion 
that the homophily effect (McPherson et al., 2001) does not only play a fundamental role in 
suppression of interpersonal conflicts, but is also an important determinant of in-group coherence, 
the results here accordingly demonstrate that similarities, in fact, guide social selection mechanisms 
at corporate boards (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Treadwell, 2006; Kakabadse et al., 2001; Giannetti 
and Zhao, 2016; Bernile et al., 2018; O’Regan et al., 2005; Ingley and van der Walt, 2003). More 
specifically, a supervisory board network is primarily driven by the match of expertise gained through 
multiple companies and industries. On the other hand, a supervisory-executive directorship network 
is, for the most part, driven by preferences for those executive directors who gained experience 
through multiple companies belonging to multiple industries, whereas the same rule does not guide 
the preferential attachment towards CEOs, despite the fact that they also represent the executive staff. 
In contrast, boards tend to prefer engagements with CEOs who have experience gained from multiple 
companies but not multiple industries, which signifies that higher and more specialized knowledge is 
expected of CEOs rather than of the other representatives of the executive tier (Westphal, 1998; 
Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001). 
It is crucial to note that, aside from a number of limitations, this paper provides several important 
contributions for both practitioners and researchers. On one hand, practitioners should, first and 
foremost, be aware that pursuing careers in either corporate boards or management requires higher 
visibility, which is achieved through dynamism, turnover and continuous exposure to different 
corporate environments. However, though the dynamics are recognized at both CEO and other 
executive directorship positions, particular care should be taken over exposure to different corporate 
environments when it comes to CEOs, as corporate boards have no particular interest in experience 
across different industries. On the other hand, this study contributes to what we know about the 
composition of corporate governance in different ways. First, it observes the network behind the 
structure, thus emphasizing the importance of seeing relations as both a theoretical concept and an 
empirical tool for understanding the development of aggregations of social actors. Second, the paper 
utilizes social network analysis methodology, particularly exponential random graph models 
(ERGMs). to underpin the theoretical argument that emergence of relational ties depends on both the 
presence and the absence of other ties in the network. Third, the study fills the gap in the literature as 
it integrates discussion of board-management selection processes together with supervisory-board 
selection processes, which to the author’s knowledge has not yet been done. Lastly, this study 
analyses social selection processes at the cross-board instead of single-board level, thus highlighting 
the importance of arguing for the condition of interdependence as the main component in network 
structuring mechanisms. 
The main limitations that should be addressed in future research are the following. First, the empirical 
results are based only on a sample of Danish public companies, and by excluding private companies, 
it might raise concerns of generalizability. Second, this study has a cross-sectional character, which 
does not allow network parameters related to network dynamics to be specified. Thus, it is not 
possible to argue how the corporate governance collaboration network changes over time. Future 
research should take up these challenges to further inspect network dynamics in both public and 
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